E. Resp	Responsibilities of the Board				
E.1	Board Duties and Responsibilities		Y/N Reference/ Source document		
	Clearly defined board responsibilitie				
E.1.1	Does the company disclose its corporate governance policy / board charter?	OECD PRINCIPLE V: Disclosure and Transparency (A) Disclosure should include, but not be limited to, material information on: 8. Governance structures and policies, in particular, the content of any corporate governance code or policy and the process by which it is implemented.	Υ	Corporate Governance Manual (https://www.afpmbai.com.ph/afpmbai_ref_materials/Final_Amended_Manual_of_CorpGov.pdf). Charters of Board Committees: - Governance Committee (https://www.afpmbai.com.ph/acgs/2018/Revised_Governance_Committee_Charter.pdf) - Audit Committee (https://www.afpmbai.com.ph/acgs/2019/Revised%20AudCom%20Charter(17_January_2019).pdf) - Risk Management and Related Party Transaction Committee (https://afpmbai.com.ph/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Revised_RMRPTC_Charter.pdf) - Investment Committee (https://www.afpmbai.com.ph/acgs/2018/Revised_Investment_Committee_Charter.pdf) - Nomination and Remuneration Committee (https://www.afpmbai.com.ph/acgs/2018/Revised_NRC_Charter.pdf) - Social Services Program Committee (https://www.afpmbai.com.ph/acgs/2018/Revised_SSPC_Charter.pdf)	
E.1.2	Are the types of decisions requiring board of directors/commissioners' approval disclosed ?	OECD PRINCIPLE VI (D)	Y	2019 Amended Manual of Corporate Governance, Pages 7-8 (https://www.afpmbai.com.ph/afpmbai_ref_materials/Final_Amended_Manual_of_CorpGov.pdf#page=7) Powers of the Board "The Board of Trustees shall have management and control over the affairs and properties of AFPMBAI. In addition to the above general powers, the Board of Trustees shall have the following specific powers:"2019 New Bylaws (http://www.afpmbai.com.ph/afpmbai_ref_materials/2019%20By-Laws.pdf) ARTICLE VI. BOARD OF TRUSTEES Section 1. Powers - "The Association shall be managed and its corporate powers exercised by a Board of Trustees which shall have the management and control of the affairs and properties of the Association. In addition to the general powers above provided, the Board of Trustees shall have the following specific powers"	
E.1.3	Are the roles and responsibilities of the board of directors/commissioners clearly stated ?		Y	2019 Amended Manual of Corporate Governance, Ill.Board of Trustees - J. Duties and Responsibilities of a Trustee Pages 12- 13 (https://www.afpmbai.com.ph/afpmbai_ref_materials/Final_Amended_Manual_of_CorpGov.pdf#page=12) 2019 New Bylaws, ARTICLE VI. BOARD OF TRUSTEES - Section 2. Duties and Responsibilities (http://www.afpmbai.com.ph/afpmbai_ref_materials/2019%20By-Laws.pdf)	
	Corporate Vision/Mission				
E.1.4	Does the company have a vision and mission statement?	OECD PRINCIPLE 6 (P58) ICGN:3.2 Integrity ICGN:3.2 Integrity The board is responsible for overseeing the implementation and maintenance of a culture of integrity. The board should encourage a culture of integrity permeating all aspects of the co., and secure that its vision, mission and objectives are ethically sound.	Y	2019 Annual Report, Page 3 (https://www.afpmbai.com.ph/afpmbai_ref_materials/2019_%20AFPMBAI_Annual_Report(low).pdf#page=2). Excerpt from the 2019 Annual Report VISION STATEMENT The leader and industry standard for all Mutual Benefit Association MISSION STATEMENT To provide members and their families comprehensive insurance and lifetime financial security	
E.1.5	Has the board review the vision and mission/strategy in the last financial year?		Y	Governance Report of the 2019 Annual Report, page 28 (https://www.afpmbai.com.ph/afpmbai_ref_materials/2019_%20AFPMBAI_Annual_Report(low).pdf#page=15) "A Strategic Planning Retreat was held last Aug. 15, 2019 where Members of the Board and management reviewed and discussed the company's Vision, Mission, Critical Issues, Financial Goals and Strategic Intents. It was then followed by a series of management strategic planning meetings and deliberation to the Board where the new Charter Statement and Corporate Strategies were approved"	
E.1.6	Does the board of directors monitor/oversee the implementation of the corporate strategy?		Y	Governance Report of the 2019 Annual Report, pages 21-25 (https://www.afpmbai.com.ph/afpmbai_ref_materials/2019_%20AFPMBAI_Annual_Report(low).pdf#page=11) Governance Committee (page 21) "Is most significant achievement for 2019 is the amendment to the Manual of Corporate Governance, which followed the principles of the Code of Corporate Governance for Publicly-Listed Companies, when these principles were applicable to the Association"Audit Committee (page 22) "The Audit Committee (AudCom) exercised its oversight over the Internal Audit Office (IAO) by ensuring that all engagement activities were accomplished, including the review of the Association's Statutory Audit of Financial Statements for CY2018. AudCom It also closely monitored the accomplishment of Accedata, the information system project of the Association"Investment Committee (page 22) "For 2019, the Investment Committee oversaw the performance of the Association's short-term, fixed income, equity investments and lending portfolio. The committee also regularly monitored the Association's investments under Investment Management Agreements with trusted banks, ensured optimum investment yield and surplus margins, and evaluated other potential investments of the Association"Risk Management and Related Party Transactions Committee (Page 23) "The Risk Management and Related Party Transactions Committee (RMRPTC) exercised its oversight over Management's efforts in integrating risk management in all business decisions and processes, identifying top risk exposures of the Association, establishing risk appetite, implementing risk mitigation and management, as well as assuring AFPMBAI's compliance with laws, rules and regulations"Nomination and Remuneration Committee (page 24) "For 2019, the Nomination and Remuneration Committee (page 24) "For 2019, the Nomination and Remuneration Committee (page 24) "For 2019, the Social Services Program Committee (page 24) "For 2019, the Social Services Program Committee (page 25) "For CY 2019, the	

E.2	Board structure			
C.2	Code of Ethics or Conduct			
E.2.1		OECD PRINCIPLE VI	Υ	Code of Ethics (https://afpmbai.com.ph/acgs/2020/E.2.1_Code_of_Ethics.pdf)
	conduct disclosed?	(C) The board should apply high ethical standards. It should take into account		
	Does the company disclose that all	the interests of stakeholders. The board has a key role in setting the ethical tone of a company, not only by	Υ	Code of Ethics "Cornerstone"(https://afpmbai.com.ph/acgs/2020/E.2.1_Code_of_Ethics.pdf)
	directors/commissioners, senior management and employees are	its own actions, but also in appointing and overseeing key executives and		
	required to comply with the code?	consequently the management in general. High ethical standards are in the		
	.,	long term interests of the company as a means to make it credible and		
E.2.3	Does the company disclose how it	trustworthy, not only in day-to-day operations but also with respect to longer term commitments. To make the objectives of the board clear and	Υ	Code of Ethics page 3 (https://afpmbai.com.ph/acgs/2020/E.2.1_Code_of_Ethics.pdf#page=3)
	implements and monitors compliance	operational, many companies have found it useful to develop company codes		Recordkeeping and Public Disclosures
	with the code of ethics or conduct?	of conduct based on, inter alia, professional standards and sometimes		All corporate records must be complete, accurate and truthful. This way, the Association can provide reliable source of information. These
		broader codes of behaviour. The latter might include a voluntary commitment by the company (including its subsidiaries) to comply with the OECD		should also be maintained in accordance with established recordkeeping policies and procedures.
		Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises which reflect all four principles		All must comply with established guidelines in the disclosure of financial reports and public documents in keeping with the provisions and
		contained in the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Labour Rights.		intent of the law.
		Company-wide codes serve as a standard for conduct by both the board and		Code of Conduct pages 22-27 (https://afpmbai.com.ph/acgs/2020/E.2.3_Code_of_Conduct_Pages22-27.pdf)
		key executives, setting the framework for the exercise of judgement in dealing with varying and often conflicting constituencies. At a minimum, the		Investigation Rules and Procedures
		ethical code should set clear limits on the pursuit of private interests,		A. Complaint/Irregularity/Incident Report or any Analogous Document
		including dealings in the shares of the company. An overall framework for		B. Light Offenses (Misdemeanor and Light Offenses) C. Serious Offenses (Less Grave and Grave Offenses)
		ethical conduct goes beyond compliance with the law, which should always be a fundamental requirement.		D. Investigation Proper
		So a faridamental requirement.		E. Report of the Investigation Board
				F. Management Decision
	Board Structure & Composition	<u> </u>	1	l .
E.2.4	Do independent	OECD PRINCIPLE VI (E)	N	2019 New Bylaws, Article VI (Board of Trustees) Section 3 (http://www.afpmbai.com.ph/afpmbai_ref_materials/2019%20By-
	directors/commissioners make up at	In order to exercise its duties of monitoring managerial performance,		Laws.pdf#page=7) which states :
	least 50% of the board of directors/commissioners?	preventing conflicts of interest and balancing competing demands on the corporation, it is essential that the board is able to exercise objective		"Section 3. Composition - The Board of Trustees shall consist of fifteen (15) members, all of whom shall be elected during the Annual
	un octora/commissioners (judgement. In the first instance this will mean independence and objectivity		Membership Meeting from among the regular members of the Association. The Board shall be composed of one (1) each from the Office
		with respect to management with important implications for the composition		of the Chief of Staff, AFP; the Philippine Army, the Philippine Navy, the Philippine Air Force, the Philippine Coast Guard, the Bureau of
		and structure of the board. Board independence in these circumstances		Fire Protection, the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology, the Joint Staff of GHQ AFP, and the Office of the AFP Sergeant Major; two (2) from the Philippine National Police; one (1) at large; and three (3) independent trustees at least one (1) of whom shall be a retired
		usually requires that a sufficient number of board members will need to be independent of management. The ASX Code recommends at least a majority		two (2) from the Philippine National Police; one (1) at large; and three (3) independent trustees at least one (1) of whom shall be a retired member of the uniformed services. Trustees must possess the necessary education, competence and experience in business, preferably
		of independent directors, while the UK Code recommends at least half of the		in insurance operation to qualify for election to the Board."
		board, excluding the Chairman, be independent directors. The minimum of		Governance Report of the 2019 Annual Report, page 17 (https://www.afpmbai.com.ph/afpmbai_ref_materials/2019_%
		three independent directors is to ensure that companies with small boards have enough independent directors (note that stock exchange rules often		20AFPMBAI_Annual_Report(low).pdf#page=9)
		require at least two independent directors).		BOARD INDEPENDENCE
				"The AFPMBAI Board also has three (3) independent trustees, representing twenty percent (20%) of the 15-member Board, who
				ensure an independent mindset at the Board level. Although governance standards recommend that at least fifty percent (50%) of Board members be independent trustees, none of Association's trustees actually have a stake in the company other than their membership
				through the availment of an insurance policy."
E.2.5	Are the independent	OECD PRINCIPLE VI (E)	Y	2019 Amended Manual of Corporate Governance, pages 10-11
	directors/commissioners independent	In order to exercise its duties of monitoring managerial performance,	Υ	(https://www.afpmbai.com.ph/afpmbai_ref_materials/Final_Amended_Manual_of_CorpGov.pdf#page=10);
	directors/commissioners independent of management and major/ substantial	In order to exercise its duties of monitoring managerial performance, preventing conflicts of interest and balancing competing demands on the	Y	(https://www.afpmbai.com.ph/afpmbai_ref_materials/Final_Amended_Manual_of_CorpGov.pdf#page=10); 2019 New Bylaws, Article VI (Board of Trustees), Section 11 (Independent Trustees)
	directors/commissioners independent	In order to exercise its duties of monitoring managerial performance,	Υ	(https://www.afpmbai.com.ph/afpmbai_ref_materials/Final_Amended_Manual_of_CorpGov.pdf#page=10);
	directors/commissioners independent of management and major/ substantial	In order to exercise its duties of monitoring managerial performance, preventing conflicts of interest and balancing competing demands on the corporation, it is essential that the board is able to exercise objective j	Υ	(https://www.afpmbai.com.ph/afpmbai_ref_materials/Final_Amended_Manual_of_CorpGov.pdf#page=10); 2019 New Bylaws, Article VI (Board of Trustees), Section 11 (Independent Trustees)
	directors/commissioners independent of management and major/ substantial	In order to exercise its duties of monitoring managerial performance, preventing conflicts of interest and balancing competing demands on the corporation, it is essential that the board is able to exercise objective judgement. In the first instance this will mean independence and objectivity with respect to management with important implications for the composition and structure of the board. Board independence in these circumstances	Y	(https://www.afpmbai.com.ph/afpmbai_ref_materials/Final_Amended_Manual_of_CorpGov.pdf#page=10); 2019 New Bylaws, Article VI (Board of Trustees), Section 11 (Independent Trustees)
	directors/commissioners independent of management and major/ substantial	In order to exercise its duties of monitoring managerial performance, preventing conflicts of interest and balancing competing demands on the corporation, it is essential that the board is able to exercise objective judgement. In the first instance this will mean independence and objectivity with respect to management with important implications for the composition	Υ	(https://www.afpmbai.com.ph/afpmbai_ref_materials/Final_Amended_Manual_of_CorpGov.pdf#page=10); 2019 New Bylaws, Article VI (Board of Trustees), Section 11 (Independent Trustees)
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	directors/commissioners independent of management and major/ substantial	In order to exercise its duties of monitoring managerial performance, preventing conflicts of interest and balancing competing demands on the corporation, it is essential that the board is able to exercise objective judgement. In the first instance this will mean independence and objectivity with respect to management with important implications for the composition and structure of the board. Board independence in these circumstances usually requires that a sufficient number of board members will need to be independent of management. The variety of board structures, ownership patterns and practices in different	Y	(https://www.afpmbai.com.ph/afpmbai_ref_materials/Final_Amended_Manual_of_CorpGov.pdf#page=10); 2019 New Bylaws, Article VI (Board of Trustees), Section 11 (Independent Trustees)
	directors/commissioners independent of management and major/ substantial shareholders?	In order to exercise its duties of monitoring managerial performance, preventing conflicts of interest and balancing competing demands on the corporation, it is essential that the board is able to exercise objective judgement. In the first instance this will mean independence and objectivity with respect to management with important implications for the composition and structure of the board. Board independence in these circumstances usually requires that a sufficient number of board members will need to be independent of management. The variety of board structures, ownership patterns and practices in different countries will thus require different approaches to the issue of board objectivity. In many instances objectivity requires that a sufficient number of		(https://www.afpmbai.com.ph/afpmbai_ref_materials/Final_Amended_Manual_of_CorpGov.pdf#page=10); 2019 New Bylaws, Article VI (Board of Trustees), Section 11 (Independent Trustees) (http://www.afpmbai.com.ph/afpmbai_ref_materials/2019%20By-Laws.pdf#page=8).
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	Does the company have any executive		N	
	directors who serve on more than two boards of listed companies outside of			
	the group?			
	Nominating Committee		<u> </u>	
	Does the company have a Nominating	OECD PRINCIPLE II (C)	Υ	2019 Amended Manual of Corporate Governance, Page 17
	Committee (NC)?	(3) Effective shareholder participation in key corporate governance decisions,	١.	(https://www.afpmbai.com.ph/afpmbai_ref_materials/Final_Amended_Manual_of_CorpGov.pdf#page=17);
		such as the nomination and election of board members, should be facilitated.		Governance Report of the 2019 Annual Report, Page 24
		Shareholders should be able to make their views known on the remuneration		(https://www.afpmbai.com.ph/afpmbai_ref_materials/2019_%20AFPMBAI_Annual_Report(low).pdf#page=13)
		policy for board members and key executives. The equity component of		
		compensation schemes for board members and employees should be subject		
		to shareholder approval.		
		With respect to nomination of candidates, boards in many companies have		
		established Nominating Committees to ensure proper compliance with		
		established nomination procedures and to facilitate and coordinate the search		
		for a balanced and qualified board. It is increasingly regarded as good		
		practice in many countries for independent board members to have a key role		
		on this committee. To further improve the selection process, the Principles		
E.2.11	Does the Nominating Committee	also call for full disclosure of the experience and background of candidates	N	Governance Report of the 2019 Annual Report, page 24
	comprise of a majority of independent	for the board and the nomination process, which will allow an informed assessment of the abilities and suitability of each candidate.		(https://www.afpmbai.com.ph/afpmbai_ref_materials/2019_%20AFPMBAI_Annual_Report(low).pdf#page=13).
	directors/commissioners?	assessment of the abilities and suitability of each candidate.		
		OECD PRINCIPLE VI (E)		
		(1) Boards should consider assigning a sufficient number of non-executive		
		board members capable of exercising independent judgement to tasks where		
		there is a potential for conflict of interest. Examples of such key		
		responsibilities are ensuring the integrity of financial and non-financial		
		reporting, the review of related party transactions, nomination of board	l	
		members and key executives, and board remuneration.		
			l	
			l	
			l	
			l	
E.2.12	Is the chairman of the Namination	This item is in most codes of semestre severage:	N	Governance Report of the 2019 Annual Report, page 24
	Is the chairman of the Nominating Committee an independent	This item is in most codes of corporate governance.	N	Governance Report of the 2019 Annual Report, page 24 [https://www.afpmbai.com.ph/afpmbai_ref_materials/2019_%20AFPMBAI_Annual_Report(low).pdf#page=13).
	director/commissioner?			
			<u></u>	
	Does the company disclose the terms	OECD PRINCIPLE VI (E)	Υ	Revised Nomination and Remuneration Committee Charter
	of reference/ governance	(2) When committees of the board are established, their mandate,		(https://www.afpmbai.com.ph/acgs/2018/Revised_NRC_Charter.pdf)
	structure/charter of the Nominating	composition and working procedures should be well defined and disclosed by		
	Committee?	the board.		
E.2.14	Did the Nominating Committee meet	While the use of committees may improve the work of the board they may	Y	Governance Report of the 2019 Annual Report, page 24
	at least twice during the year?	also raise questions about the collective responsibility of the board and of	'	(https://www.afpmbai.com.ph/afpmbai_ref_materials/2019_%20AFPMBAI_Annual_Report(low).pdf#page=13).
	at load twice during the year!	individual board members. In order to evaluate the merits of board		(mpo///mananoomp///ap/man_o_mo_o_o_o_o_o_o_o_o_o_o_o
		committees it is therefore important that the market receives a full and clear		
		picture of their purpose, duties and composition. Such information is		
		particularly important in an increasing number of jurisdictions where boards		
E 2 15	It the attendance of members at	particularly important in an increasing number of jurisdictions where boards are establishing independent Audit Committees with powers to oversee the	v	Governance Report of the 2019 Annual Report, page 24
-	Is the attendance of members at	particularly important in an increasing number of jurisdictions where boards are establishing independent Audit Committees with powers to oversee the relationship with the external auditor and to act in many cases independently.	Υ	Governance Report of the 2019 Annual Report, page 24 (https://www.afpmbai.com.ph/afpmbai.ref_materials/2019_%20AFPMRAI_Annual_Report(low).pdf#nage=13)
	Nominating Committee meetings	particularly important in an increasing number of jurisdictions where boards are establishing independent Audit Committees with powers to oversee the relationship with the external auditor and to act in many cases independently. Other such committees include those dealing with nomination and	Y	Governance Report of the 2019 Annual Report, page 24 (https://www.afpmbai.com.ph/afpmbai_ref_materials/2019_%20AFPMBAI_Annual_Report(low).pdf#page=13).
		particularly important in an increasing number of jurisdictions where boards are establishing independent Audit Committees with powers to oversee the relationship with the external auditor and to act in many cases independently.	Y	
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E.2.17 E.2.18	Nominating Committee meetings disclosed? Remuneration Committee/ Compens Does the company have a Remuneration Committee? Does the Remuneration Committee comprise of a majority of independent directors/commissioners? Is the chairman of the Remuneration Committee an independent director/commissioner?	particularly important in an increasing number of jurisdictions where boards are establishing independent Audit Committees with powers to oversee the relationship with the external auditor and to act in many cases independently. Other such committees include those dealing with nomination and compensation. The accountability of the rest of the board and the board as a whole should be clear. Disclosure should not extend to committees set up to deal with, for example, confidential commercial transactions Given the responsibilities of the NC spelt out in codes of corporate governance, the NC is unlikely to be fulfilling these responsibilities effectively if it is only meeting once a year. Globally, the NC of large companies would meet several times a year. **Sation Committee** **DECD PRINCIPLE VI (D)** (4) Aligning key executive and board remuneration with the longer term interests of the company and its shareholders. It is considered good practice in an increasing number of countries that remuneration policy and employment contracts for board members and key executives be handled by a special committee of the board comprising either wholly or a majority of independent directors. There are also calls for a Remuneration Committee that excludes executives that serve on each others' Remuneration Committees, which could lead to conflicts of interest. **DECD PRINCIPLE VI (E)**	Y N N	(https://www.afpmbai.com.ph/afpmbai_ref_materials/2019_%20AFPMBAI_Annual_Report(low).pdf#page=13). 2019 Amended Manual of Corporate Governance, Page 17 (https://www.afpmbai.com.ph/afpmbai_ref_materials/Final_Amended_Manual_of_CorpGov.pdf#page=17); Nomination and Remuneration Committee (Annex K) "The Committee's purpose is to ensure that there is a Board succession plan and that the Board has a complete set of Regular and Independent Trustees based on defined competency requirements. The Committee will also implement the Board Performance Evaluation and Rating System." Governance Report of the 2019 Annual Report, Page 24 (https://www.afpmbai.com.ph/afpmbai_ref_materials/2019_%20AFPMBAI_Annual_Report(low).pdf#page=13) Nomination and Remuneration Charter, Page 2 (https://www.afpmbai.com.ph/acgs/2018/Revised_NRC_Charter.pdf#page=2); Governance Report of the 2019 Annual Report, Page 24 (https://www.afpmbai.com.ph/afpmbai_ref_materials/2019_%20AFPMBAI_Annual_Report(low).pdf#page=13)
E.2.17 E.2.18 E.2.19	Nominating Committee meetings disclosed? Remuneration Committee/ Compens Does the company have a Remuneration Committee? Does the Remuneration Committee comprise of a majority of independent directors/commissioners? Is the chairman of the Remuneration Committee an independent director/commissioner?	particularly important in an increasing number of jurisdictions where boards are establishing independent Audit Committees with powers to oversee the relationship with the external auditor and to act in many cases independently. Other such committees include those dealing with nomination and compensation. The accountability of the rest of the board and the board as a whole should be clear. Disclosure should not extend to committees set up to deal with, for example, confidential commercial transactions Given the responsibilities of the NC spelt out in codes of corporate governance, the NC is unlikely to be fulfilling these responsibilities effectively if it is only meeting once a year. Globally, the NC of large companies would meet several times a year. **Sation Committee** **DECD PRINCIPLE VI (D)** (4) Aligning key executive and board remuneration with the longer term interests of the company and its shareholders. It is considered good practice in an increasing number of countries that remuneration policy and employment contracts for board members and key executives be handled by a special committee of the board comprising either wholly or a majority of independent directors. There are also calls for a Remuneration Committee that excludes executives that serve on each others' Remuneration Committees, which could lead to conflicts of interest. **OECD PRINCIPLE VI (E)** **OECD PRINCIPLE VI (E)** **OECD PRINCIPLE VI (E)* **QUI When committees of the board are established, their mandate,	Y N N	(https://www.afpmbai.com.ph/afpmbai_ref_materials/2019_%20AFPMBAI_Annual_Report(low).pdf#page=13). 2019 Amended Manual of Corporate Governance, Page 17 (https://www.afpmbai.com.ph/afpmbai_ref_materials/Final_Amended_Manual_of_CorpGov.pdf#page=17); Nomination and Remuneration Committee (Annex K) "The Committee's purpose is to ensure that there is a Board succession plan and that the Board has a complete set of Regular and Independent Trustees based on defined competency requirements. The Committee will also implement the Board Performance Evaluation and Rating System." Governance Report of the 2019 Annual Report, Page 24 (https://www.afpmbai.com.ph/afpmbai_ref_materials/2019_%20AFPMBAI_Annual_Report(low).pdf#page=13) Nomination and Remuneration Charter, Page 2 (https://www.afpmbai.com.ph/acgs/2018/Revised_NRC_Charter.pdf#page=2); Governance Report of the 2019 Annual Report, Page 24 (https://www.afpmbai.com.ph/afpmbai_ref_materials/2019_%20AFPMBAI_Annual_Report(low).pdf#page=13) Nomination and Remuneration Charter, Page 2 (https://www.afpmbai.com.ph/acgs/2018/Revised_NRC_Charter.pdf#page=2); Governance Report of the 2019 Annual Report, Page 24 (https://www.afpmbai.com.ph/afpmbai_ref_materials/2019_%20AFPMBAI_Annual_Report(low).pdf#page=13)
E.2.17 E.2.18 E.2.19	Nominating Committee meetings disclosed? Remuneration Committee/ Compension of the company have a Remuneration Committee? Does the Remuneration Committee comprise of a majority of independent directors/commissioners? Is the chairman of the Remuneration Committee an independent director/commissioner?	particularly important in an increasing number of jurisdictions where boards are establishing independent Audit Committees with powers to oversee the relationship with the external auditor and to act in many cases independently. Other such committees include those dealing with nomination and compensation. The accountability of the rest of the board and the board as a whole should be clear. Disclosure should not extend to committees set up to deal with, for example, confidential commercial transactions Given the responsibilities of the NC spelt out in codes of corporate governance, the NC is unlikely to be fulfilling these responsibilities effectively if it is only meeting once a year. Globally, the NC of large companies would meet several times a year. Sation Committee DECD PRINCIPLE VI (D) (4) Aligning key executive and board remuneration with the longer term interests of the company and its shareholders. It is considered good practice in an increasing number of countries that remuneration policy and employment contracts for board members and key executives be handled by a special committee of the board comprising either wholly or a majority of independent directors. There are also calls for a Remuneration Committee that excludes executives that serve on each others' Remuneration Committees, which could lead to conflicts of interest. DECD PRINCIPLE VI (E) (2) When committees of the board are established, their mandate, composition and working procedures should be well defined and disclosed by	Y N N	(https://www.afpmbai.com.ph/afpmbai_ref_materials/2019_%20AFPMBAI_Annual_Report(low).pdf#page=13). 2019 Amended Manual of Corporate Governance, Page 17 (https://www.afpmbai.com.ph/afpmbai_ref_materials/Final_Amended_Manual_of_CorpGov.pdf#page=17); Nomination and Remuneration Committee (Annex K) "The Committee's purpose is to ensure that there is a Board succession plan and that the Board has a complete set of Regular and Independent Trustees based on defined competency requirements. The Committee will also implement the Board Performance Evaluation and Rating System." Governance Report of the 2019 Annual Report, Page 24 (https://www.afpmbai.com.ph/afpmbai_ref_materials/2019_%20AFPMBAI_Annual_Report(low).pdf#page=13) Nomination and Remuneration Charter, Page 2 (https://www.afpmbai.com.ph/acgs/2018/Revised_NRC_Charter.pdf#page=2); Governance Report of the 2019 Annual Report, Page 24 (https://www.afpmbai.com.ph/afpmbai_ref_materials/2019_%20AFPMBAI_Annual_Report(low).pdf#page=13) Nomination and Remuneration Charter, Page 2 (https://www.afpmbai.com.ph/acgs/2018/Revised_NRC_Charter.pdf#page=2); Governance Report of the 2019 Annual Report, Page 24 (https://www.afpmbai.com.ph/afpmbai_ref_materials/2019_%20AFPMBAI_Annual_Report(low).pdf#page=13)
E.2.17 E.2.18 E.2.19	Nominating Committee meetings disclosed? Remuneration Committee/ Compens Does the company have a Remuneration Committee? Does the Remuneration Committee comprise of a majority of independent directors/commissioners? Is the chairman of the Remuneration Committee an independent director/commissioner?	particularly important in an increasing number of jurisdictions where boards are establishing independent Audit Committees with powers to oversee the relationship with the external auditor and to act in many cases independently. Other such committees include those dealing with nomination and compensation. The accountability of the rest of the board and the board as a whole should be clear. Disclosure should not extend to committees set up to deal with, for example, confidential commercial transactions Given the responsibilities of the NC spelt out in codes of corporate governance, the NC is unlikely to be fulfilling these responsibilities effectively if it is only meeting once a year. Globally, the NC of large companies would meet several times a year. **Sation Committee** **DECD PRINCIPLE VI (D)** (4) Aligning key executive and board remuneration with the longer term interests of the company and its shareholders. It is considered good practice in an increasing number of countries that remuneration policy and employment contracts for board members and key executives be handled by a special committee of the board comprising either wholly or a majority of independent directors. There are also calls for a Remuneration Committee that excludes executives that serve on each others' Remuneration Committees, which could lead to conflicts of interest. **OECD PRINCIPLE VI (E)** **OECD PRINCIPLE VI (E)** **OECD PRINCIPLE VI (E)* **QUI When committees of the board are established, their mandate,	Y N N	(https://www.afpmbai.com.ph/afpmbai_ref_materials/2019_%20AFPMBAI_Annual_Report(low).pdf#page=13). 2019 Amended Manual of Corporate Governance, Page 17 (https://www.afpmbai.com.ph/afpmbai_ref_materials/Final_Amended_Manual_of_CorpGov.pdf#page=17); Nomination and Remuneration Committee (Annex K) "The Committee's purpose is to ensure that there is a Board succession plan and that the Board has a complete set of Regular and Independent Trustees based on defined competency requirements. The Committee will also implement the Board Performance Evaluation and Rating System." Governance Report of the 2019 Annual Report, Page 24 (https://www.afpmbai.com.ph/afpmbai_ref_materials/2019_%20AFPMBAI_Annual_Report(low).pdf#page=13) Nomination and Remuneration Charter, Page 2 (https://www.afpmbai.com.ph/acgs/2018/Revised_NRC_Charter.pdf#page=2); Governance Report of the 2019 Annual Report, Page 24 (https://www.afpmbai.com.ph/afpmbai_ref_materials/2019_%20AFPMBAI_Annual_Report(low).pdf#page=13) Nomination and Remuneration Charter, Page 2 (https://www.afpmbai.com.ph/acgs/2018/Revised_NRC_Charter.pdf#page=2); Governance Report of the 2019 Annual Report, Page 24 (https://www.afpmbai.com.ph/afpmbai_ref_materials/2019_%20AFPMBAI_Annual_Report(low).pdf#page=13)

E.2.21	Did the Remuneration Committee meet at least twice during the year? Is the attendance of members at Remuneration Committee meetings disclosed?	While the use of committees may improve the work of the board they may also raise questions about the collective responsibility of the board and of individual board members. In order to evaluate the merits of board committees it is therefore important that the market receives a full and clear picture of their purpose, duties and composition. Such information is particularly important in an increasing number of jurisdictions where boards are establishing independent Audit Committees with powers to oversee the relationship with the external auditor and to act in many cases independently. Other such committees include those dealing with nomination and compensation. The accountability of the rest of the board and the board as a whole should be clear. Disclosure should not extend to committees set up to deal with, for example, confidential commercial transactions Given the responsibilities of the Remuneration Committee (RC) which are spelt out in codes of corporate governance, the RC is unlikely to be fulfilling these responsibilities effectively if it only meets once a year. Globally, the RC of large companies would meet several times a year.		Governance Report of the 2019 Annual Report, Page 24 (https://www.afpmbai.com.ph/afpmbai_ref_materials/2019_%20AFPMBAI_Annual_Report(low).pdf#page=13) Governance Report of the 2019 Annual Report, Page 24 (https://www.afpmbai.com.ph/afpmbai_ref_materials/2019_%20AFPMBAI_Annual_Report(low).pdf#page=13)
-	Audit Committee	I.		
E.2.22	Does the company have an Audit Committee?	OECD PRINCIPLE VI (E) (1) Boards should consider assigning a sufficient number of non-executive board members capable of exercising independent judgement to tasks where there is a potential for conflict of interest. Examples of such key responsibilities are ensuring the integrity of financial and non-financial reporting, the review of related party transactions, nomination of board members and key executives, and board remuneration.	Y	2019 Amended Manual of Corporate Governance, Page 17 (https://www.afpmbai.com.ph/afpmbai_ref_materials/Final_Amended_Manual_of_CorpGov.pdf#page=17); Audit Committee (Annex H) The Committee is purpose is to provide a structured, systematic oversight of AFPMBAI's governance and internal control practices. The Committee also assists the Board and Management by providing advice and guidance on the adequacy of AFPMBAI's initiatives for: 1. Values and Ethics 2. Governance Structure 3. Risk Management 4. Internal Control Framework 5. Oversight of the Internal Audit Office, External Auditors, and Other Providers of Assurance 6. Financial Performance and Public Accountability Reporting Governance Report of the 2019 Annual Report, Page 22 (https://www.afpmbai.com.ph/afpmbai_ref_materials/2019_%20AFPMBAI_Annual_Report(low).pdf#page=12)
E.2.23	Does the Audit Committee comprise entirely of non-executive directors/commissioners with a majority of independent directors/commissioners?	OECD PRINCIPLE VI (E) (2) When committees of the board are established, their mandate, composition and working procedures should be well defined and disclosed by the board. While the use of committees may improve the work of the board they may also raise questions about the collective responsibility of the board and of individual board members. In order to evaluate the merits of board committees it is therefore important that the market receives a full and clear picture of their purpose, duties and composition. Such information is particularly important in the increasing number of jurisdictions where boards are establishing independent Audit Committees with powers to oversee the relationship with the external auditor and to act in many cases independently. Other such committees include those dealing with nomination and compensation. The accountability of the rest of the board and the board as a whole should be clear. Disclosure should not extend to committees set up to deal with, for example, confidential commercial transactions.		Governance Report of the 2019 Annual Report, Page 22 (https://www.afpmbai.com.ph/afpmbai_ref_materials/2019_%20AFPMBAI_Annual_Report(low).pdf#page=12) Audit Committee "Independent Trustee BGen Florentino P Manalastas Jr. AFP (Ret), the former Chairman of the Audit Committee, had training in the ISO 9000- 2000 Series Lead Auditor Course, PERA Neville Clark in 2006. Aside from being a lawyer, he also had an MBA from UP Diliman. The Chairman who succeeded him, MGen Ernesto D Boac AFP, has extensive experience as Comptroller in the Armed Forces of the Philippines. He also completed the Professional Managers Program at the Ateneo Graduate School of Business"
E.2.24	Is the chairman of the Audit Committee an independent		Υ	Governance Report of the 2019 Annual Report, Page 22 (https://www.afpmbai.com.ph/afpmbai_ref_materials/2019_%20AFPMBAI_Annual_Report(low).pdf#page=12)
	director/commissioner?			Audit Committee "Independent Trustee BGen Florentino P Manalastas Jr. AFP (Ret), the former Chairman of the Audit Committee, had training in the ISO 9000-2000 Series Lead Auditor Course, PERA Neville Clark in 2006. Aside from being a lawyer, he also had an MBA from UP Diliman. The Chairman who succeeded him, MGen Ernesto D Boac AFP, has extensive experience as Comptroller in the Armed Forces of the Philippines. He also completed the Professional Managers Program at the Ateneo Graduate School of Business"
E.2.25	Does the company disclose the terms of reference/governance structure/charter of the Audit Committee?		Y	Audit Committee Charter (https://www.afpmbai.com.ph/acgs/2019/Revised%20AudCom%20Charter(17_January_2019).pdf)
E.2.26	Does the Annual Report disclose the profile or qualifications of the Audit Committee members?	Most codes specify the need for accounting/finance expertise or experience.	Υ	Governance Report of the 2019 Annual Report, Page 22 (https://www.afpmbai.com.ph/afpmbai_ref_materials/2019_%20AFPMBAI_Annual_Report(low).pdf#page=12) Audit Committee "Independent Trustee BGen Florentino P Manalastas Jr. AFP (Ret), the former Chairman of the Audit Committee, had training in the ISO 9000-2000 Series Lead Auditor Course, PERA Neville Clark in 2006. Aside from being a lawyer, he also had an MBA from UP Diliman. The Chairman who succeeded him, MGen Emesto D Boac AFP, has extensive experience as Comptroller in the Armed Forces of the Philippines. He also completed the Professional Managers Program at the Ateneo Graduate School of Business"

E.2.27	Does at least one of the independent directors/commissioners of the committee have accounting expertise (accounting qualification or experience)?	UK CODE (JUNE 2010) C.3.1. The board should satisfy itself that at least one member of the Audit Committee has recent and relevant financial experience. As many of the key responsibilities of the Audit Committee are accounting-related, such as oversight of financial reporting and audits, it is important to have someone specifically with accounting expertise, not just general	Y	Governance Report of the 2019 Annual Report, Page 22 (https://www.afpmbai.com.ph/afpmbai_ref_materials/2019_%20AFPMBAI_Annual_Report(low).pdf#page=12) Audit Committee "independent Trustee BGen Florentino P Manalastas Jr. AFP (Ret), the former Chairman of the Audit Committee, had training in the ISO 9000- 2000 Series Lead Auditor Course, PERA Neville Clark in 2006. Aside from being a lawyer, he also had an MBA from UP Diliman. The Chairman who succeeded him, MGen Ernesto D Boac AFP, has extensive experience as Comptroller in the Armed Forces of the
		financial expertise.		Philippines. He also completed the Professional Managers Program at the Ateneo Graduate School of Business"
E.2.28	Did the Audit Committee meet at least four times during the year?		Υ	Governance Report of the 2019 Annual Report, Page 22 (https://www.afpmbai.com.ph/afpmbai ref materials/2019 %20AFPMBAI Annual Report(low).pdf#page=12)
E.2.29	Is the attendance of members at Audit		Y	
E.Z.29	Committee meetings disclosed?		ī	Governance Report of the 2019 Annual Report, Page 22 (https://www.afpmbai.com.ph/afpmbai_ref_materials/2019_%20AFPMBAI_Annual_Report(low).pdf#page=12)
E.2.30	Does the Audit Committee have	UK CODE (JUNE 2010)	Y	Audit Committee Charter (https://www.afpmbai.com.ph/acgs/2019/Revised%20AudCom%20Charter(17_January_2019).pdf);
	primary responsibility for recommendation on the appointment, and removal of the external auditor?	C.3.6 The Audit Committee should have primary responsibility for making a recommendation on the appointment, reappointment and removal of the external auditor. If the board does not accept the Audit Committee's recommendation, it should include in the Annual Report, and in any papers recommending appointment or re-appointment, a statement from the Audit Committee explaining the recommendation and should set out reasons why the board has taken a different position.		Summary of Minutes of the 2020 AGM, pages 4-5 (https://afpmbai.com.ph/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Summary_of_Minutes_Final.pdf#page=4).
E.3	Poord Processes			
L.J	Board Processes Board meetings and attendance			
E.3.1	Are the board of directors meeting scheduled before the start of financial year?	Scheduling board meetings before or at the beginning of the year would allow directors to plan ahead to attend such meetings, thereby helping to maximise participation, especially as non-executive directors often have other commitments. Additional ad hoc meetings can always be scheduled if and when necessary. It is common practice for boards in developed markets to schedule meetings in this way.	Y	Signed Inter Office Memo dated 6 December 2019 (https://afpmbai.com.ph/acgs/2020/Sched_of_Meeting_for_CY2020.jpg).
E.3.2	Does the board of	WORLDBANK PRINCIPLE 6	Υ	Governance Report of the 2019 Annual Report, pages 19-20
	directors/commissioners meet at least six times during the year?	(VI.I.24) Does the board meet at least six times per year?		(https://www.afpmbai.com.ph/afpmbai_ref_materials/2019_%20AFPMBAI_Annual_Report(low).pdf#page=10).
		INDO SCORECARD E.10. How many meetings were held in the past year?		
		if the board met more than six times, the firm earns a "Y" score. If four to six meetings, the firm was scored as "fair", while less than four times was scored as "N"		
E.3.3	Has each of the directors/commissioners attended at least 75% of all the board meetings held during the year?	OECD PRINCIPLE VI (E) (3) Board members should be able to commit themselves effectively to their responsibilities.	N	Governance Report of the 2019 Annual Report, pages 19-20 (https://www.afpmbai.com.ph/afpmbai_ref_materials/2019_%20AFPMBAI_Annual_Report(low).pdf#page=10).
		Specific limitations may be less important than ensuring that members of the board enjoy legitimacy and confidence in the eyes of shareholders. Achieving legitimacy would also be facilitated by the publication of attendance records for individual board members (e.g. whether they have missed a significant number of meetings) and any other work undertaken on behalf of the board and the associated remuneration.		
E.3.4	Does the company require a minimum	WORLDBANK PRINCIPLE 6	N	Protocol for Board Meetings, Page 1
	quorum of at least 2/3 for board decisions?	(VI.I.28) Is there a minimum quorum of at least 2/3 for board decisions to be valid?		(https://www.afpmbai.com.ph/afpmbai_ref_materials/Amended_Protocol_for_Board_Committee_Meetings.pdf)
				Quorum and Attendance "A majority of the Trustees shall constitute a quorum for the transaction of business, and every decision of the majority of a quorum duly assembled as a Board shall be valid as a corporate act."
E.3.5	Did the non-executive directors/commissioners of the company meet separately at least once during the year without any executives present?	WORLDBANK PRINCIPLE 6 (VI.E.1.6) Does the corporate governance framework requires or encourages boards to conduct executive sessions?	Y	Governance Report of the 2019 Annual Report, page 22-23 (https://www.afpmbai.com.ph/afpmbai_ref_materials/2019_%20AFPMBAI_Annual_Report(low).pdf#page=12) on Audit Committee and Risk Management and Related Party Transaction Committee Meetings
	Access to information			
E.3.6	Are board papers for board of directors/commissioners meetings	OECD PRINCIPLE VI (F) In order to fulfil their responsibilities, board members should have access	Y	Board Meeting Protocol, page 3 [https://www.afpmbai.com.ph/afpmbai_ref_materials/Amended_Protocol_for_Board_Committee_Meetings.pdf#page=3)
	provided to the board at least five	to accurate, relevant and timely information.		Totala T
	business days in advance of the board meeting?	Board members require relevant information on a timely basis in order to		
		support their decision-making. Non-executive board members do not typically have the same access to information as key managers within the company.		
		The contributions of non-executive board members to the company can be		
		enhanced by providing access to certain key managers within the company such as, for example, the company secretary and the internal auditor, and		
		recourse to independent external advice at the expense of the company. In		
		order to fulfil their responsibilities, board members should ensure that they obtain accurate, relevant and timely information.		
		WORLDBANK PRINCIPLE 6		
		(VI.F.2) Does such information need to be provided to the board at least five		
		business days in advance of the board meeting?		
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E.3.7	Does the company secretary play a significant role in supporting the board in discharging its responsibilities?	OECD PRINCIPLE VI (F) ICSA Guidance on the Corporate Governance Role of the Company Secretary	Y	2019 Amended Manual of Corporate Governance, VI. Corporate Officers - Corporate Secretary, Pages 21-22 (https://www.afpmbai.com.ph/afpmbai_ref_materials/Final_Amended_Manual_of_CorpGov.pdf#page=21); 2019 New Bylaws, Article VII (Officers) Section 6 which states: Section 6. Corporate Secretary — The Corporate Secretary, who shall be a citizen and resident of the Philippines, a member of the Bar, may or may not be a member of the Board, but shall be a member of the Association. He shall have the following duties and powers: a. He shall keep, or cause to be kept, a book of minutes at the principal office, of all meetings of the Board of Trustees and of members of the Association, with the time and place of such meetings, whether regular or special, and if special, how authorized, the notice given thereto, the name of those present (or represented at member's meetings), and the proceeding thereof. b. He shall keep or cause to be kept at the principal office, or at the Association's Branch Offices, a members' register, (or a duplicate member's register,) showing the names and dates of certificates issued to them and such other pertinent information as may be required by law. c. He shall give, or cause to be given, notice of all the meetings of the members, and of the Board, required by law or by the Articles of Incorporation and ByLaws; and shall certify all minutes, records and proceedings of the Board, and of the members. d. He shall keep the seal of the Association in safe custody, and turn over to his successor all records in his custody. e. He shall exercise such power and perform such duties as prescribed by the Board of Trustees or by the Insurance Commission, the Securities and Exchange Commission, and other regulatory agencies, including this By-Laws and the Governance Manual.
E.3.8	Is the company secretary trained in legal, accountancy or company secretarial practices?	WORLDBANK PRINCIPLE 6 (VI.D.2.12) Do company boards have a professional and qualified company secretary?	Υ	2019 Bylaws, page 9 (http://www.afpmbai.com.ph/afpmbai_ref_materials/2019%20By-Laws.pdf#page=9).
E.3.9	Board Appointments and Re-Election Does the company disclose the criteria	•	Υ	2019 Amended Manual of Corporate Governance, Pages 9-10
	used in selecting new directors/commissioners?	To further improve the selection process, the Principles also call for full disclosure of the experience and background of candidates for the board and the nomination process, which will allow an informed assessment of the abilities and suitability of each candidate. OECD Principle VI (D) (5) Ensuring a formal and transparent board nomination and election process. These Principles promote an active role for shareholders in the nomination and election of board members. The board has an essential role to play in ensuring that this and other aspects of the nominations and election process are respected. First, while actual procedures for nomination may differ among countries, the board or a nomination committee has a special responsibility to make sure that established procedures are transparent and respected. Second, the board has a key role in identifying potential members for the board with the appropriate knowledge, competencies and expertise to complement the existing skills of the board and thereby improve its value-adding potential for the company. In several countries there are calls for an open search process extending to a broad range of people.		(https://www.afpmbai.com.ph/afpmbai_ref_materials/Final_Amended_Manual_of_CorpGov.pdf#page=9).
E.3.10	Does the company disclose the process followed in appointing new directors/commissioners?		Y	2019 New Bylaws, ARTICLE VI. BOARD OF TRUSTEES - Sections 3 and 5, which reads: (http://www.afpmbai.com.ph/afpmbai_ref_materials/2019%20By-Laws.pdf#page=7) "Section 3. Composition - The Board of Trustees shall consist of fifteen (15) members, all of whom shall be elected during the Annual Membership Meeting from among the regular members of the Association. The Board shall be composed of one (1) each from the Office of the Chief of Staff, AFP; the Philippine Army, the Philippine Navy, the Philippine Air Force, the Philippine Coast Guard, the Bureau of Fire Protection, the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology, the Joint Staff of GHQ AFP, and the Office of the AFP Sergeant Major; two (2) from the Philippine National Police; one (1) at large; and three (3) independent trustees at least one (1) of whom shall be a retired member of the uniformed services. Trustees must possess the necessary education, competence and experience in business, preferably in insurance operation to qualify for election to the Board.""Section 5. Vacancy - Any vacancy in the Board of Trustees other than by removal or expiration of term may be filled by the vote of at least a majority of the remaining trustees, if still constituting a quorum, in a regular or special meeting called for the purpose."
E.3.11	Are all the directors/commissioners subject to re-election at least once every three years?	ICGN: 2.9.1 Election of directors: Directors should be conscious of their accountability to shareholders, and many jurisdictions have mechanisms to ensure that this is in place on an ongoing basis. There are some markets however where such accountability is less apparent and in these each director should stand for election on an annual basis. Elsewhere directors should stand for election at least once every three years, though they should face evaluation more frequently. WORLDBANK PRINCIPLE 6 (VI.1.3) Can the re-election of board members be staggered over time? (Staggered boards are those where only a part of the board is re-elected at each election, e.g. only 1/3 of directors are re-elected every year.)	Y	DEFAULT

E.3.12	Does the company disclose its remuneration (fees, allowances, benefit-in-kind and other emoluments) policy/practices (i.e. the use of short term and long term incentives and performance measures) for its executive directors and CEO?	OECD PRINCIPLE VI (D) (4) Aligning key executive and board remuneration with the longer term interests of the company and its shareholders. In an increasing number of countries it is regarded as good practice for boards to develop and disclose a remuneration policy statement covering board members and key executives. Such policy statements specify the relationship between remuneration and performance, and include measurable standards that emphasise the longer run interests of the company over short term considerations. Policy statements generally tend to set conditions for payments to board members for extra-board activities, such as consulting. They also often specify terms to be observed by board members and key executives about holding and trading the stock of the company, and the procedures to be followed in granting and re-pricing of options. In some countries, policy also covers the payments to be made when terminating the contract of an executive. UK CODE (JUNE 2010)	Y	2019 New Bylaws, ARTICLE VI. BOARD OF TRUSTEES - Section 12 which reads (http://www.afpmbai.com.ph/afpmbai_ref_materials/2019%20By-Laws.pdf#page=8): "Section 12. Remuneration. The members of the Board of Trustees shall not receive any compensation or remuneration for their services as such, except for reasonable allowance and per diem." 2019 New Bylaws, ARTICLE VI. BOARD OF TRUSTEES - Section 12 which reads
	for non-executive directors/commissioners?	D.1.3 Levels of remuneration for non-executive directors should reflect the time commitment and responsibilities of the role. Disclosure of fee structure for non-executive directors allows shareholders to assess if these directors are remunerated in an appropriate manner, for example, whether they are paid for taking on additional responsibilities and contributions, such as chairing committees.		(http://www.afpmbai.com.ph/afpmbai_ref_materials/2019%20By-Laws.pdf#page=8): "Section 12. Remuneration. The members of the Board of Trustees shall not receive any compensation or remuneration for their services as such, except for reasonable allowance and per diem."
E.3.14	Do the shareholders or the Board of Directors approve the remuneration of the executive directors and/or the senior executives?	OECD PRINCIPLE VI. (D.4) The Board should fulfil certain key functions including aligning key executive and board remuneration with the longer term interests of the company and its shareholders. ICGN 2.3 (D) and (E) D. Selecting, remunerating, monitoring and where necessary replacing key executives and overseeing succession planning. E. Aligning key executives and Board remuneration with the longer term interest of the company and its shareholders.		DEFAULT 2010 New Pulsage APTICLE VI BOADD OF TRUSTEES. Section 12 which reads
E.3.15	Do independent non-executive directors/commissioners receive options, performance shares or bonuses?	UK CODE (JUNE 2010) (D.1.3) Levels of remuneration for non-executive directors should reflect the time commitment and responsibilities of the role. Remuneration for non-executive directors should not include share options or other performance-related elements. If, by exception, options are granted, shareholder approval should be sought in advance and any shares acquired by exercise of the options should be held until at least one year after the non-executive director leaves the board. Holding of share options could be relevant to the determination of a non-executive director's independence (as set out in provision B.1.1). ASX CODE Box 8.2 Guidelines for non-executive director remuneration Companies may find it useful to consider the following when considering non-executive director remuneration: 1. Non-executive directors should normally be remunerated by way of fees, in the form of cash, noncash benefits, superannuation contributions or salary sacrifice into equity; they should not normally participate in schemes designed for the remuneration of executives. 2. Non-executive directors should not be provided with retirement benefits other than superannuation.	N	2019 New Bylaws, ARTICLE VI. BOARD OF TRUSTEES - Section 12 which reads (http://www.afpmbai.com.ph/afpmbai_ref_materials/2019%20By-Laws.pdf#page=8): "Section 12. Remuneration. The members of the Board of Trustees shall not receive any compensation or remuneration for their services as such, except for reasonable allowance and per diem."
E.3.16	Internal Audit Does the company have a separate	OECD PRINCIPLE VI (D)	Υ	DEFAULT
	internal audit function?	(7) Ensuring the integrity of the corporation's accounting and financial reporting systems, including the independent audit, and that appropriate systems of control are in place, in particular, systems for risk management, financial and operational control, and compliance with the law and relevant standards. Ensuring the integrity of the essential reporting and monitoring systems will require the board to set and enforce clear lines of responsibility and accountability throughout the organisation. The board will also need to ensure that there is appropriate oversight by senior management. One way of doing this is through an internal audit system directly reporting to the board.		
E.3.17	Is the head of internal audit identified or, if outsourced, is the name of the external firm disclosed?	Companies often disclose that they have an internal audit but, in practice, it is not uncommon for it to exist more in form than in substance. For example, the in-house internal audit may be assigned to someone with other operational responsibilities. As internal audit is unregulated, unlike external audit, there are firms providing outsourced internal audit services which are not properly qualified to do so. Making the identity of the head of internal audit or the external service provider public would provide some level of safeguard that the internal audit is substantive.		AFPMBAI Management on the 2019 Annual Report, page 44 (https://www.afpmbai.com.ph/afpmbai_ref_materials/2019_%20AFPMBAI_Annual_Report(low).pdf#page=22).

	Does the appointment and removal of the internal auditor require the approval of the Audit Committee? Risk Oversight	OECD PRINCIPLE VI (D) (7) In some jurisdictions it is considered good practice for the internal auditors to report to an independent Audit Committee of the board or an equivalent body which is also responsible for managing the relationship with the external auditor, thereby allowing a coordinated response by the board. WORLDBANK PRINCIPLE 6 (VI.D.7.9) Does the internal auditors have direct and unfettered access to the board of directors and its independent Audit Committee? ASX Principles on CG "companies should consider a second reporting line from the internal audit function to the board or relevant committee." Under the ASX Principles it is also recommended that the Audit Committee have access to internal audit without the presence of management, and that "the audit committee should recommend to the board the appointment and dismissal of a chief internal audit executive."	Y	DEFAULT
E.3.19	Does the company disclose the	OECD PRINCIPLE 6 (VI) (D) (7)	Υ	Audit Committee Charter (https://www.afpmbai.com.ph/acgs/2019/Revised%20AudCom%20Charter(17_January_2019).pdf)
L.3.13	internal control procedures/risk management systems it has in place?	Ensuring the integrity of the corporation's accounting and financial reporting systems, including the independent audit, and that appropriate systems of control are in place, in particular, systems for risk management, financial and operational control, and compliance with the law and relevant standards.	•	Adult Committee Criaties (https://www.appinbal.com.phracgs/2013/tevisee//2204dCom//22001ales/11_January_2013/pdu)
E.3.20	Does the Annual Report disclose that the board of directors/commissioners has conducted a review of the	UK CODE (JUNE 2010) C.2.1 The board should, at least annually, conduct a review of the effectiveness of the company's risk management and internal control systems and should report to characteristics.	Y	Governance Report of the 2018 Annual Report, page 22 (https://www.afpmbai.com.ph/afpmbai_ref_materials/2019_%20AFPMBAL_Annual_Report(low).pdf#page=12).
	company's material controls (including operational, financial and compliance controls) and risk management systems?	and should report to shareholders that they have done so. The review should cover all material controls, including financial, operational and compliance controls.		
E.3.21	Does the company disclose how key risks are managed?	OECD PRINCIPLE V (A) (6) Foreseeable risk factors.	Y	Governance Report of the 2019 Annual Report, pages 30-31 (https://www.afpmbai.com.ph/afpmbai_ref_materials/2019_%20AFPMBAI_Annual_Report(low).pdf#page=16)
E.3.22	Does the Annual Report contain a statement from the board of directors/commissioners or Audit Committee commenting on the adequacy of the company's internal controls/risk management systems?	OECD PRINCIPLE 6 (VI) (D) (7) Ensuring the integrity of the corporation's accounting and financial reporting systems, including the independent audit, and that appropriate systems of control are in place, in particular, systems for risk management, financial and operational control, and compliance with the law and relevant standards.	Y	Audit Committee Charter (https://www.afpmbai.com.ph/acgs/2019/Revised%20AudCom%20Charter(17_January_2019).pdf)
		In some jurisdictions it is considered good practice for the internal auditors to report to an independent audit committee of the board or an equivalent body which is also responsible for managing the relationship with the external auditor, thereby allowing a coordinated response by the board. It should also be regarded as good practice for this committee, or equivalent body, to review and report to the board the most critical accounting policies which are the basis for financial reports. However, the board should retain final responsibility for ensuring the integrity of the reporting systems. Some countries have provided for the chair of the board to report on the internal control process.		
E.4	People on the Board			
E 4.4	Board Chairman	OF OR PRIMOURLE W	v	O
	Do different persons assume the roles of chairman and CEO?	(E) The board should be able to exercise objective independent judgement on corporate affairs. In a number of countries with single tier board systems, the objectivity of the board and its independence from management may be strengthened by the separation of the role of chief executive and chairman, or, if these roles are combined, by designating a lead non-executive director to convene or chair sessions of the outside directors. Separation of the two posts may be regarded as good practice, as it can help to achieve an appropriate balance of power, increase accountability and improve the board's capacity for decision making independent of management. UK Code (June 2010) A.3.1 The chairman should on appointment meet the independence criteria	Y	Summary of Minutes of the 2020 AGM, page 1 (https://afpmbai.com.ph/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Summary_of_Minutes_Final.pdf)
E.4.2	Is the chairman an independent	A.3.1 in e chairman should on appointment meet the independence criteria set out in B.1.1 below. A chief executive should not go on to be chairman of the same company. If, exceptionally, a board decides that a chief executive should become chairman, the board should consult major shareholders in advance and should set out its reasons to shareholders at the time of the	N	2019 Amended Manual of Corporate Governance, Composition of the Board,pages 8-9
	director/commissioner?	appointment and in the next Annual Report.		(https://www.afpmbai.com.ph/afpmbai_ref_materials/Final_Amended_Manual_of_CorpGov.pdf#page=8).
E.4.3	Has the chairman been the company CEO in the last three years?	ASX Code Recommendation 3.2 The chief executive officer should not go on to become chair of the same company. A former chief executive officer will not qualify as an "independent" director unless there has been a period of at least three years between ceasing employment with the company and serving on the board.	N	Annual Report from 2016, 2017, 2018, and 2019
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E.4.4	chairman disclosed?	ICGN: 2.5 Role of the Chair The chair has the crucial function of setting the right context in terms of board agenda, the provision of information to directors, and open boardroom discussions, to enable the directors to generate the effective board debate and discussion and to provide the constructive challenge which the company needs. The chair should work to create and maintain the culture of openness and constructive challenge which allows a diversity of views to be expressedThe chair should be available to shareholders for dialogue on key matters of the company's governance and where shareholders have particular concerns.	Υ	2019 Amended Manual of Corporate Governance, pages 18-19 (https://www.afpmbai.com.ph/afpmbai_ref_materials/Final_Amended_Manual_of_CorpGov.pdf#page=18).
E.4.5	Skills and Competencies Does at least one non-executive director/commissioner have prior working experience in the major sector that the company is operating in?	ICGN: 2.4.3 Independence Alongside appropriate skill, competence and experience, and the appropriate context to encourage effective behaviours, one of the principal features of a well-governed corporation is the exercise by its board of directors of independent judgement, meaning judgement in the best interests of the corporation, free of any external influence on any individual director, or the board as a whole. In order to provide this independent judgement, and to generate confidence that independent judgement is being applied, a board should include a strong presence of independent non-executive directors with appropriate competencies including key industry sector knowledge and experience. There should be at least a majority of independent directors on each board.	Y	Governance Report of the 2019 Annual Report, pages 15-16 (https://www.afpmbai.com.ph/afpmbai_ref_materials/2019_%20AFPMBAI_Annual_Report(low).pdf#page=8)
E.4.6	Does the company disclose a board of directors/commissioners diversity policy?	ASX Code Recommendation 3.2 Companies should establish a policy concerning diversity and disclose the policy or a summary of that policy. The policy should include requirements for the board to establish measurable objectives for achieving gender diversity and for the board to assess annually both the objectives and progress in achieving them. Regulations and codes of corporate governance in many developed markets now incorporate board diversity as a consideration in board composition	Y	Corporate Governance Manual (https://www.afpmbai.com.ph/afpmbai_ref_materials/Final_Amended_Manual_of_CorpGov.pdf); 2019 Annual Report page 17 (https://www.afpmbai.com.ph/afpmbai_ref_materials/2019_%20AFPMBAI_Annual_Report(low).pdf#page=9); 2019 New By- Laws, Article VII (Officers) Section 3 which reads: "Section 3. Composition - The Board of Trustees shall consist of fifteen (15) members, all of whom shall be elected during the Annual Membership Meeting from among the regular members of the Association. The Board shall be composed of one (1) each from the Office of the Chief of Staff, AFF); the Philippine Army, the Philippine Navy, the Philippine Air Force, the Philippine Coast Guard, the Bureau of Fire Protection, the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology, the Joint Staff of GHQ AFP, and the Office of the AFP Sergeant Major; two (2) from the Philippine National Police; one (1) at large; and three (3) independent trustees at least one (1) of whom shall be a retired member of the uniformed services. Trustees must possess the necessary education, competence and experience in business, preferably in insurance operation to qualify for election to the Board."
E.5	Board Performance			
E.5.1	Does the company have orientation programmes for new directors/commissioners?	This item is in most codes of corporate governance.	Y	2019 Amended Manual of Corporate Governance, Pages 11-12 [https://www.afpmbai.com.ph/afpmbai_ref_materials/Final_Amended_Manual_of_CorpGov.pdf#page=11); Governance Report of the 2019 Annual Report, page 18 [https://www.afpmbai.com.ph/afpmbai_ref_materials/2019_%20AFPMBAI_Annual_Report(low).pdf#page=10)
	Does the company have a policy that encourages directors/commissioners to attend on-going or continuous professional education programmes?	OECD PRINCIPLE VI (E) (3) Board members should be able to commit themselves effectively to their responsibilities. In order to improve board practices and the performance of its members, an increasing number of jurisdictions are now encouraging companies to engage in board training and voluntary self-evaluation that meets the needs of the individual company. This might include that board members acquire appropriate skills upon appointment, and thereafter remain abreast of relevant new laws, regulations, and changing commercial risks through inhouse training and external courses.	Y	Governance Report of the 2019 Annual Report, page 18 (https://www.afpmbai.com.ph/afpmbai_ref_materials/2019_%20AFPMBAI_Annual_Report(low).pdf#page=10).
	Appointments and Performance Does the company disclose how the board of directors/commissioners plans for the succession of the CEO/Managing Director/President and key management?	OECD PRINCIPLE VI (D) (3) Selecting, compensating, monitoring and, when necessary, replacing key executives and overseeing succession planning. In two tier board systems the supervisory board is also responsible for appointing the management board which will normally comprise most of the key executives.	Y	2019 New By-Laws, Article VII (Officers) Section 5 which reads: "Section 5. The Senior Vice Presidents shall be appointed by the Chairman of the Board duly endorsed by the members of the Board of Trustees. In case of the incapacity, illness, or death of the President, the Chairman shall appoint the next senior officer (a) until his successor is appointed, and whom so acting, he shall have all the powers of, and be subjected to the restrictions upon, the President. He shall have direct and active management of the business operations of the Association pursuant to these By-Laws, policies of the Board, instructions of the President, and according to his own directions, whenever and whatever the same is not expressly limited by such rules, policies or instructions."
E.5.4	Does the board of directors/commissioners conduct an annual performance assessment of the CEO/Managing	OECD PRINCIPLE VI (D) (2). Monitoring the effectiveness of the company's governance practices and making changes as needed. Monitoring of governance by the board also includes continuous review of the	Y	Governance Report of the 2019 Annual Report, page 27 (https://www.afpmbai.com.ph/afpmbai_ref_materials/2019_%20AFPMBAI_Annual_Report(low).pdf#page=14) PRESIDENT AND CEO "The performance assessment of the President and only Executive Trustee is based on the corporate score of the Association, a score

	Board Appraisal					
	Is an annual performance assessment conducted of the board of directors/commissioners?	OECD PRINCIPLE VI (D) (2)	Y	Governance Report of the 2019 Annual Report, pages 25-27 (https://www.afpmbai.com.ph/afpmbai_ref_materials/2019_%20AFPMBAI_Annual_Report(low).pdf#page=13).		
	Does the company disclose the process followed in conducting the board assessment?		Y	Governance Report of the 2019 Annual Report, pages 25-27 (https://www.afpmbai.com.ph/afpmbai_ref_materials/2019_%20AFPMBAI_Annual_Report(low).pdf#page=13).		
E.5.7	Does the company disclose the criteria used in the board assessment?		Y	Governance Report of the 2019 Annual Report, pages 25-27 (https://www.afpmbai.com.ph/afpmbai_ref_materials/2019_%20AFPMBAI_Annual_Report(low).pdf#page=13).		
	Director Appraisal					
	Is an annual performance assessment conducted of individual director/commissioner?	OECD PRINCIPLE VI (D) (2)	Y	Governance Report of the 2019 Annual Report, pages 25-27 (https://www.afpmbai.com.ph/afpmbai_ref_materials/2019_%20AFPMBAL_Annual_Report(low).pdf#page=13).		
	Does the company disclose the process followed in conducting the director/commissioner assessment?		Y	Governance Report of the 2019 Annual Report, pages 25-27 (https://www.afpmbai.com.ph/afpmbai_ref_materials/2019_%20AFPMBAI_Annual_Report(low).pdf#page=13).		
E.5.10	Does the company disclose the criteria used in the director/commissioner assessment?		Υ	Governance Report of the 2019 Annual Report, pages 25-27 (https://www.afpmbai.com.ph/afpmbai_ref_materials/2019_%20AFPMBAI_Annual_Report(low).pdf#page=13).		
	Committee Appraisal			 		
	directors/commissioners committees?	UK CODE (JUNE 2010) B.6 Evaluation: The board should undertake a formal and rigorous annual evaluation of its own performance and that of its committees and individual directors.	Y	Governance Report of the 2019 Annual Report, pages 25-27 (https://www.afpmbai.com.ph/afpmbai_ref_materials/2019_%20AFPMBAI_Annual_Report(low).pdf#page=13).		